Therefore, it is important to briefly survey the iterations of the principles of war from inception to today before proposing an amended set of principles to guide the construction of a framework for war. Fuller, are not divine verities above recourse they are instead intended to be a responsive tool for the application of war. The principles of war, first developed by British theorist and general officer J.F.C. The principles of war are the best place to begin this discussion because, if properly linked with the systems-dominated character of war, they provide a solid foundation for establishing a comprehensive conceptual framework for LSCO against great-power competitors. 3 The way that concepts such as multi-domain operations (MDO), LSCOs and Project Convergence, to name a few, connect to the systems theory of war is not well supported thus, it is out of step with the true practice of war.Ī framework for war will help overcome this problem by providing purpose, structure and taxonomy to the discussions. 2ĭefense analyst Michael Kofman, among others, recently argued that the dizzying array of disparate battle-fighting concepts, and their byzantine connection to the systems-dominated character of war, contributes to this problem. Indeed, the reliance on words such as leverage, reputation, advantage and narrative, as well as tactical concepts like overmatch and dominance, leave much to be desired for armed forces that are focused on strategic victory.
Army Multi-Domain Transformation’s reliance on extant jargon-positions of relative advantage, the primacy of first battles, consolidation of gains, decisiveness and condition setting-is a tiresome collection of buzzwords that adds little to the ongoing dialogue of the conduct of war. Rather, the paper provides solutions to discrete battlefield problems while completely missing the systems aspect of war-robust, redundant and networked structures striving to overcome the robust, redundant and networked structures of adversaries who are seeking both to avoid destruction and to obtain victory.įurthermore, stale tropes continue to dominate “nascent” Western military thought and “new” U.S. 1 It does so by not addressing war or the exercise of large-scale combat operations (LSCOs) in a broad framework against a great-power competitor. Army publication, Army Multi-Domain Transformation, which is both tactically-minded and task-oriented, contributes to this problem. military and its allies’ rapid dominance over Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq in the spring of 2003 proved vacuous, as an amorphous, deadly and multifaceted insurgency flowed from that success.Ī problem in existing and nascent literature about war is that it tends to focus on visions that deny or do not accept the realities of war, while continuing to advance disproven or unfounded assertions about the conduct of war. To be sure, the U.S and its allies quickly toppled the Taliban in the wake of 9/11, but they are arguably no closer to victory in Afghanistan today than they were at any previous point. Battles and campaigns might quickly reach a conclusion, but the direct link between victory in an individual battle or campaign to strategic victory is dubious such a connection is certainly not supported by an historical analysis of modern war. As a result, wars are not fought and won quickly, nor are they fought or won at specific points. Wars, especially against great-power competitors, are and will continue to be ponderous affairs that stretch over extended periods of time they conclude only when an adversary is driven to strategic depletion or to a situation in which they are unwilling to continue withstanding the erosion of their resources and capabilities. War is not fought against time, distance, speed, range or integrated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. War today, and for the foreseeable future, is the competition among belligerent, robust and redundant systems. AUSA Volunteer Family of the Year Award.Letters to Congress & the Administration.
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